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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to Philip Atkins’ reply to my attempt to explain 
why Gettier cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misleading. I have argued that Gettier 
cases (and Gettier-style cases) are misdealing because the candidates for knowledge in 
such cases contain ambiguous designators. Atkins denies that Gettier’s original cases 
contain ambiguous designators and offers his intuition that the subjects in Gettier’s 
original cases do not know. I argue that his reply amounts to mere intuition mongering 
and I explain why Gettier cases, even Atkins’ revised version of Gettier’s Case I, still 
contain ambiguous designators. 
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1. Introduction 
In a reply to my “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading,”1 Philip Atkins sets out to 
defend the “orthodox view in contemporary epistemology,” according to which 
“Edmund Gettier refuted the JTB [Justified True Belief] analysis of knowledge” 
(emphasis added).2 Before I address Atkins’ objections against the argument I put 
forth in “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading,” I would like to point out a few 
things that I find rather peculiar about his reply. First, Atkins contends that 
“Gettier’s two cases […] are genuine counterexamples to the JTB analysis.”3 But 
then he proceeds to “revise Gettier’s first case so that there is no such semantic 
failure [i.e., failure to refer to the semantic referent of ‘coins’]” (emphasis added). 
If Atkins needs to revise Gettier’s Case I in response to my criticism against it, 
then that means that Gettier’s original case is not a genuine counterexample to the 
JTB analysis. After all, if it were a genuine counterexample, then there would be 
no need to revise it; it would work against the JTB analysis just as it is. Of course, 
epistemologists have long recognized that Gettier’s original cases are problematic. 
One problem with Gettier’s original cases, which I discuss in the paper to which 
Atkins responds, is the problem of false lemmas. Many epistemologists have found 
                                                                
1 Moti Mizrahi, “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading,” Logos & Episteme 7 (2016): 31-44. 
2 Philip Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases Misleading?” Logos & Episteme 7 (2016): 379-384. 
3 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 379. 
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it problematic that the subjects in Gettier’s original cases infer their candidates for 
knowledge from falsehoods, and so have constructed Gettier-style cases with “no 
false lemmas.”4 Curiously, Atkins does not mention any of this and proceeds to 
defend Gettier’s original cases as if they are entirely unproblematic, even though 
he is aware of the fact that I discuss “several ‘Gettier cases’ besides the two that 
Gettier originated.”5 As a result, Atkins’ paper presents a somewhat inaccurate 
picture of the state of the debate over the status of Gettier cases as a “refutation” of 
the JTB analysis of knowledge. 
Speaking of “refutations,” another thing I find rather peculiar about Atkins’ 
reply to my “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading” is his use of the term ‘refutation’ 
in conjunction with his hedging and seeming talk. On the one hand, Atkins claims 
that Gettier’s original “cases refute the JTB analysis of knowledge” (emphasis 
added).6 If such cases do indeed amount to a refutation of the JTB analysis of 
knowledge, however, it is difficult to see why Atkins needs to hedge his claims 
and engage in seeming talk. Here are a couple of examples from his paper: 
Many have the strong intuition that Smith fails to know (I). [(I) The man who 
will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.] Since Smith is justified in believing 
(I), we seem to have a counterexample to the JTB analysis (emphasis added).7 
I cannot speak for everyone, but I have the strong intuition that Smith fails to 
know (I*). Since Smith is justified in believing (I*), we seem to have a 
counterexample to the JTB analysis (emphasis added).8 
Of course, Atkins is not doing something new here. Arguments from Gettier cases 
against JTB are nothing more than appeals to intuition. If these arguments are to 
count as refutations of the JTB analysis of knowledge, i.e., conclusive proofs that 
                                                                
4 For the “no false lemmas” response to Gettier cases, see David M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and 
Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 152 and Michael Clark, “Knowledge 
and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier’s paper,” Analysis 24 (1963): 46-48. See also Robert K. 
Shope, The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1983), 24 and the Appendix in John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge 
(Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986). Cf. Michael Levin, “Gettier Cases Without False 
Lemmas,” Erkenntnis 64 (2006): 381-392. An early so-called Gettier-style case without false 
lemmas can be found in Gilbert Harman, Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Harman, 1973), 75. Cf. William G. Lycan, “On the Gettier Problem Problem,” in Epistemology 
Futures, ed. S. Hetherington (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 148-168. Lycan 
defends JTB with the addition of the “no false lemmas” condition. 
5 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 379. 
6 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 382. 
7 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 380. 
8 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 381. 
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JTB is false, it must be the case that our intuitions about hypothetical cases, such 
as Gettier cases, perfectly track the epistemic facts about such cases. This 
assumption, however, is rather controversial,9 especially in light of the empirical 
evidence from experimental philosophy and cognitive science.10 So, again, by 
proceeding as if Gettier’s original cases are entirely unproblematic, Atkins’ paper 
presents a somewhat inaccurate picture of the state of the debate over the status of 
Gettier cases as a “refutation” of the JTB analysis of knowledge. Gettier’s original 
cases are problematic in at least two respects. First, they involve inferences from 
falsehoods. Second, the arguments made on the basis of Gettier cases are appeals to 
intuition, which are themselves a rather controversial sort of arguments in 
philosophy.11 
Finally, as the quotes above illustrate, Atkins insists that his intuition is that 
subjects in Gettier cases do not know that p. Clearly, since I have argued that 
Gettier cases are misleading, which means that we should not assign much, if any, 
evidential weight to the so-called “Gettier intuition,” i.e., the intuition that S 
doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case, I do not find Atkins’ insistence that he 
shares the “Gettier intuition” to be compelling evidence against my argument to 
the effect that Gettier cases are misleading. 
With these preliminary remarks in hand, I will now address Atkins’ 
objections and his attempt to defend the claim that Gettier’s original cases “are 
genuine counterexamples to the JTB analysis.”12 
2. Atkins’ Defense of Gettier’s Case I 
Atkins aims to defend Gettier’s Case I by modifying it such that it does not involve 
any ambiguous designators. In my “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading,” I argue 
that ‘coins’ in 
(I) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket13 
is an ambiguous designator. Atkins offers a revised case in which there are no 
ambiguous designators, or so he claims. 
                                                                
9 See Moti Mizrahi, “Don't Believe the Hype: Why Should Philosophical Theories Yield to 
Intuitions?” Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (2015): 141-158. 
10 See Moti Mizrahi, “Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense,” Metaphilosophy 46 
(2015): 52-64. 
11 See Moti Mizrahi, “Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?” Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology 5 (2014): 183-197. 
12 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 379. 
13 Edmund L. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123. 
Moti Mizrahi  
132 
Suppose that Smith has strong evidence for believing that Jones is the man who 
will get the job and that Jones is handsome. We can suppose that Smith is 
justified in believing that Jones is handsome based on seeing Jones in person. 
Smith makes a rudimentary logical inference and says the following: 
(I*) The man who will get the job is handsome. 
It turns out that (I*) is true, but not for the reasons that Smith thinks. For it turns 
out that Smith is the man who will get the job and that, unbeknownst to Smith, 
he is also handsome. I cannot speak for everyone, but I have the strong intuition 
that Smith fails to know (I*). Since Smith is justified in believing (I*), we seem to 
have a counterexample to the JTB analysis.14 
At first, Atkins simply asserts that, as far as he can tell, “there is no semantic 
failure when Smith uses the predicate ‘is handsome’.”15 But then he acknowledges 
that there is an ambiguous designator in this case after all. The ambiguous 
designator is ‘the man’. As Atkins himself writes, “The speaker’s referent [of ‘the 
man’] is Jones, whereas the semantic referent [of ‘the man’] is Smith himself.”16 
Because of this, presumably, Atkins revises Gettier’s Case I for the second 
time, this time to remove the ambiguous designator ‘the man’.  
Suppose again that Smith has strong evidence for believing that Jones is the man 
who will get the job and that Jones is handsome. Smith performs an existential 
generalization and says the following: 
(I**) There is someone who is both getting a job and handsome. 
It turns out that (I**) is true, but not for the reasons that Smith thinks. For it 
turns out that (I**) is made true by Smith himself. Even though Smith is justified 
in believing (I**), and even though (I**) is true, I have the strong intuition that 
Smith fails to know (I**).17 
At this point, however, it looks like Atkins is simply engaging in intuition 
mongering.18 He claims to have a “strong intuition that Smith fails to know (I**),”19 
but offers no reasons whatsoever to think that Smith indeed does not know that 
(I**) is the case. Perhaps Atkins has “the strong intuition that Smith fails to know 
(I**)”20 because he has been taught that that’s the “right” response to Gettier cases. 
                                                                
14 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 380-381. 
15 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 381. 
16 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 382. 
17 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 382. 
18 See Moti Mizrahi, “Intuition Mongering,” The Reasoner 6 (2012): 169-170 and Moti Mizrahi, 
“More Intuition Mongering,” The Reasoner 7 (2013): 5-6. 
19 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 382. 
20 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 382. 
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Or perhaps Atkins has “the strong intuition that Smith fails to know (I**)”21 
because Smith infers (I**) from ‘Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones is 
handsome,’ which is false by stipulation. If so, then we run into the “no false 
lemmas” (or inference from falsehoods) problem again, which Atkins completely 
ignores in his reply to my “Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading,” as I have 
mentioned above. 
More importantly, and again, as Atkins himself acknowledges, his second 
rendition of Gettier’s Case I still involves an ambiguous designator. For, as Atkins 
himself writes, “there is some sense in which Smith has Jones in mind when 
inferring (I**).”22 So, as Atkins himself admits, his second rendition of Gettier’s 
Case I is a case of reference failure after all. Atkins dismisses this referential 
ambiguity by simply asserting without argument that “this point seems irrelevant” 
(emphasis added).23 It might seem irrelevant to Atkins, and Atkins offers no 
reasons to think that it is irrelevant, but it isn’t irrelevant. In fact, it is an objection 
I address in the paper to which Atkins is replying. As I argue in “Why Gettier 
Cases Are Misleading,” if the candidates for knowledge in Gettier cases contain 
ambiguous designators, then that means that the relevant beliefs are ambiguous 
between two interpretations: “an ‘objective’ interpretation in terms of the 
conditions that make the belief true (i.e., in terms of semantic reference or what a 
speaker’s words mean) and a ‘subjective’ interpretation in terms of what S means 
(i.e., in terms of speaker’s reference or what a speaker means in uttering certain 
words).”24 In Atkins’ second rendition of Gettier’s Case I, then, the belief that 
there is someone who is both getting a job and handsome is ambiguous between 
these two interpretations: 
Objective interpretation (semantic reference): the semantic referent of ‘someone’ 
in <there is someone who is both getting the job and handsome> is the actual 
person that makes <there is someone who is both getting the job and handsome> 
true; otherwise, <there is someone who is both getting the job and handsome> 
would not be true. 
Subjective interpretation (speaker’s reference): the speaker’s referent of 
‘someone’ in <there is someone who is both getting the job and handsome> is 
what Smith has in mind when he believes that there someone who is both 
getting the job and handsome, which is Jones, not Smith himself, who is actually 
the person that makes <there is someone who is both getting the job and 
handsome> true. 
                                                                
21 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 382. 
22 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 383. 
23 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 383. 
24 Mizrahi, “Why Gettier Cases,” 43. 
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Interpreted “objectively,” or in terms of what the words mean, <there is 
someone who is both getting the job and handsome> is not what Smith actually 
believes, since Smith uses ‘there is someone who’ to talk about what his evidence 
leads him to believe, which is “that Jones is the man who will get the job and that 
Jones is handsome,”25 not that Smith is the man who will get the job and that 
Smith is handsome. Interpreted “subjectively,” or in terms of what Smith means 
by uttering these words, <there is someone who is both getting the job and 
handsome> is strictly false, since Smith uses ‘there is someone who’ to talk about 
something that does not in fact fulfill the conditions for being the semantic 
referent of ‘someone’ in this case. 
In other words, Smith’s belief that there is someone who is both getting a 
job and handsome is ambiguous between two interpretations: 
1. Semantic reference: There is someone (= Smith) who is both getting the 
job and is handsome. 
2. Speaker’s reference: There is someone (= Jones) who is both getting the 
job and is handsome. 
By stipulation, (2) is false, since it turns out that Smith gets the job. On (2), then, 
Smith simply has a false belief. On the other hand, (1) is not actually what Smith 
believes in this case, since Smith wishes to talk about Jones, which is what Smith’s 
evidence is about. To put it crudely, on (1), what goes on in Smith’s head does not 
match the facts of the case. Given this ambiguity, then, Atkins’ second rendition 
of Gettier’s Case I, like Gettier cases in general, is misleading. 
3. Atkins’ Defense of Gettier’s Case II 
Atkins’ attempt to defend Gettier’s Case II looks like another instance of intuition 
mongering. Atkins simply recounts Gettier’s Case II, without revisions, and asserts 
that 
Many have the strong intuition that Smith fails to know (h). [(h) Either Jones 
owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.] Since Smith is justified in believing (h), 
we seem to have a counterexample to the JTB analysis (emphasis added).26 
Atkins’ “strong intuition” notwithstanding, there is an ambiguous 
designator in Gettier’s Case II, as I point out in “Why Gettier Cases Are 
Misleading.” As Atkins himself writes, Smith’s evidence for (h) is that “Jones has at 
all times in the past owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered 
                                                                
25 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 382. 
26 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 383. 
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Smith a ride while driving a Ford.”27 As in Gettier’s Case I, then, there is a 
mismatch between what goes on in Smith’s head and the facts about the case. 
Another way to see this, in addition to the way I have described above, is the 
following. In Atkins’ second rendition of Gettier’s Case I, Smith reasons as follows: 
a. Jones will get the job. 
Therefore, 
b. There is someone who will get the job. 
c. Jones is handsome. 
Therefore, 
d. There is someone who is handsome. 
Therefore, 
e. There is someone who will get the job and there is someone who is handsome. 
As we can see, Smith’s evidence supports (e), not the belief that the one who will 
get the job and the one who is handsome are one and the same person. To see 
why, note that the move from (a) to (b) and the move from (c) to (d) are instances 
of existential generalization. If Smith were to reason backwards, however, from 
(e) by existential instantiation, Smith could just as easily end up with the false 
belief that Jones will get the job instead of the true belief that Smith will get the 
job; hence the ambiguity in terms of the referent of ‘someone’; in Smith’s mind 
that someone is not Smith himself, but rather Jones, since that is what Smith’s 
evidence, i.e., (a) and (c), is about. 
From a logical point of view, this counts as an instance of equivocation. 
According to Quine,  
[t]he fallacy of equivocation arises […] when the interpretation of an ambiguous 
expression is influenced in varying ways by immediate contexts […], so that the 
expression undergoes changes of meaning within the limits of the argument.28  
In Atkins’ revised version of Gettier’s Case I, Smith reasons from evidence about 
one thing (namely, Jones) to a conclusion that is made true by something else 
(namely, Smith). This switch in reference “within the limits of the argument” 
makes this case appear like a genuine counterexample to JTB, even though it is 
not. 
Similarly, in Gettier’s Case II, Smith reasons as follows: 
                                                                
27 Gettier, “Is Justified,” 122. 
28 W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic, 4th Ed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 56. 
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i. “Jones has at all times in the past within Smith’s memory owned a car” 
(emphasis added).29 
ii. “Jones has at all times in the past within Smith’s memory owned a 
Ford” (emphasis added).30 
iii. “Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford” (emphasis 
added).31 
Therefore, 
iv. Jones owns a Ford. 
Therefore, 
v. Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. 
Contrary to what Atkins suggests, Smith cannot simply make “a rudimentary 
logical inference”32 from (i)-(iii) to (v), since (v) does not follow from (i)-(iii). 
Rather, (i)-(iii) are evidence for (iv), and then Smith infers (v) from (iv) by “a 
rudimentary logical inference,”33 namely, addition. 
As stipulated, however, “Jones does not own a Ford, but is at present driving 
a rented car” (emphasis added).34 Note the use of temporal terms, such as ‘at all 
times in the past’, ‘just’, and ‘at present’, which is crucial here. For Smith wishes to 
talk about the person who “has at all times in the past within Smith’s memory 
owned a Ford” (emphasis added).35 It just so happens that this person does not own 
a Ford at present. Of course, this sort of thing happens all the time; something 
could be true about a person at one point in time and then stop being true at a 
later point in time. The proposition ‘George W. Bush is the President of the 
United States’ was true from 2001 until 2009, but it was not true before 2001 and 
it is not true at present. The proposition ‘Barack Obama is the President of the 
United States’ is true now, but it will no longer be true after January 20, 2017. 
Suppose, then, that on January 21, 2017, an eight-year-old reasons as follows: 
Barack Obama has at all times in the past within my memory been the US 
President. 
Therefore, 
                                                                
29 Gettier, “Is Justified,” 122. 
30 Gettier, “Is Justified,” 122. 
31 Gettier, “Is Justified,” 122. 
32 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 383. 
33 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 383. 
34 Gettier, “Is Justified,” 123. 
35 Gettier, “Is Justified,” 122. 
Why Gettier Cases Are Still Misleading: A Reply to Atkins 
137 
Barack Obama is the US President at present (where the present time is January 
21, 2017). 
The eight-year-old’s belief that Barack Obama is the US President at present will 
be false on January 21, 2017. The problem is that ‘Barack Obama’ is referentially 
ambiguous in this context. The reference of ‘Barack Obama’ in ‘Barack Obama has 
at all times in the past within my memory been the US President’ was fixed at 
some particular time in the past, since this piece of evidence comes from memory, 
whereas ‘Barack Obama’ in ‘Barack Obama is the US President at present’ is 
supposed to pick out the present US President. 
Similarly, Smith infers (iv) from evidence that is time-indexed to a 
particular time in the past, since Smith wishes to talk about the person who “has at 
all times in the past within Smith’s memory owned a Ford” (emphasis added),36 
but that no longer pertains to the present time, since Jones “is at present driving a 
rented car” (emphasis added).37 Accordingly, there is “an unsignaled shift in 
meaning”38 in Smith’s reasoning from “In the past, (i), (ii), and (iii) were the case” 
to “At present, (iv) is the case.” For this reason, there is an ambiguity in Gettier’s 
Case II. Unlike Gettier’s Case I (and Atkins’ revised versions of the case), however, 
the ambiguity is not in terms of the referent of ‘someone’ (i.e., Smith or Jones), but 
rather in terms of the time to which the relevant propositions are indexed (i.e., 
past or present). 
Accordingly, Smith’s evidence, i.e., (i)-(iii), supports the belief that Jones 
owns a Ford at t1 (in the past), not the belief that Jones owns a Ford at t2 (at the 
present time). To see why, note that, the move from (iv) to (v) is an instance of 
disjunction introduction. If Smith were to reason backwards, however, from (v) by 
elimination, Smith could just as easily end up with the false belief that Jones owns 
a Ford at t2 (at the present time) instead of the true belief that Jones owns a Ford at 
t1 (in the past);39 hence the ambiguity in terms of the time to which the relevant 
belief is indexed; in Smith’s mind his belief is indexed to a time in the past, not the 
present, since that is what Smith’s evidence, namely, (i)-(iii), is about. 
As with Gettier’s Case I, from the point of view of argumentation theory, 
this counts as an instance of the fallacy of equivocation. According to Johnson and 
                                                                
36 Gettier, “Is Justified,” 122. 
37 Gettier, “Is Justified,” 123. 
38 Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, Logical Self-Defense (New York: International Debate 
Education Association, 2006), 154. 
39 Assuming that Jones used to own a Ford at one point in the past. If Jones has never owned a 
Ford, even in the past, then Smith’s evidence would be misleading, and (iv) would again be 
false. 
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Blair, “equivocation occurs when the same word or phrase undergoes an 
unsignaled shift in meaning during one piece of discourse or argument.”40 In 
Gettier’s Case II, the reference of ‘Jones’ in (i)-(iii) was fixed at some particular 
time in the past, since (i)-(iii) are based on what Smith remembers about Jones, 
whereas ‘Jones’ in (iv) is supposed to pick out the present Ford owner. This switch 
in reference “during one piece of discourse or argument” makes Gettier’s Case II 
appear like a genuine counterexample to JTB, even though it is not. 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, other than engage in intuition mongering, Atkins does not really 
provide reasons to think that Gettier cases are not misleading. As I have argued in 
“Why Gettier Cases Are Misleading” and above, Gettier’s original cases are 
misleading because the candidates for knowledge in these cases contain ambiguous 
designators. In other words, in Gettier’s original cases, there is a mismatch 
between what the subjects wish to talk about (i.e., speaker’s reference) and what 
makes the relevant propositions true (i.e., semantic reference). In Atkins’ revised 
version of Gettier’s Case I, the ambiguous designator is ‘someone’. When Smith 
believes that there is someone who is both getting the job and is handsome, Smith 
has Jones in mind, for Smith’s evidence is about Jones, not about Smith himself. 
Indeed, Atkins himself admits that “there is some sense in which Smith has Jones 
in mind when inferring (I**).”41 In Gettier’s Case II, the ambiguity is in terms of 
the time to which the relevant beliefs are indexed. When Smith believes that 
either Jones own a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, Smith has past Jones in mind, 
for Smith’s evidence is about past Jones, not about present Jones. So, again, there is 
a sense in which Smith has past Jones in mind when inferring (v) from (iv) by 
addition. For some reason that he does not specify, however, Atkins deems these 
ambiguities “irrelevant.”42 
If this is correct, then it is still the case that Gettier cases are misleading 
because the candidates for knowledge in such cases contain ambiguous 
designators, which means that the relevant beliefs in such cases lend themselves to 
two interpretations: “an ‘objective’ interpretation in terms of the conditions that 
make the belief true (i.e., in terms of semantic reference or what a speaker’s words 
mean) and a ‘subjective’ interpretation in terms of what S means (i.e., in terms of 
speaker’s reference or what a speaker means in uttering certain words).”43 Because 
                                                                
40 Johnson and Blair, Logical Self-Defense, 154. 
41 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 383. 
42 Atkins, “Are Gettier Cases,” 383. 
43 Mizrahi, “Why Gettier Cases,” 43. 
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of this ambiguity, we should not assign much, if any, evidential weight to the so-
called “Gettier intuition,” i.e., the intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier 
case. 
